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Recent research has indicated strong relations between people's appraisals 
o f  their circumstances and their emotional states. The present study examined 
these relations across a range o f  unpleasant situations in which subjects ex- 
perienced complex emotional blends. Subjects recalled unpleasant experiences 
from their pasts that were associated with particular appraisals and described 
their appraisals and emotions during these experiences. Situations defined 
by particular appraisals along the human agency or situational control dimen- 
sions were reliably associated with different levels o f  anger, sadness, and guilt, 
as predicted. However, predicted differences in emotion were not observed 
for  situations selected for  appraisals along the certainty or attention dimen- 
sions. Most subjects reported experiencing blends o f  two or more emotions, 
and correlation/regression analyses indicated that even in the context o f  these 
blends, patterns o f  appraisal similar to those observed previously (Smith & 
Etlsworth, 1985, 1987) characterized the experience o f  the individual emo- 
tions. The regressions further indicated that appraisals along some dimen- 
sions were more important to the experience o f  particular emotions than were 
appraisals along other dimensions. These central appraisals are compared 
with the adaptive functions their associated emotions are believed to serve, 
and the implications o f  these findings are discussed. 
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In order to maneuver successfully in its environment, an organism must be 
able to sense and respond to events that are relevant to its needs. In lower 
organisms, the sensing is thoughtless and the response is automatic. Higher 
up the phylogenetic scale, organisms experience a much wider variety of needs 
and goals, and instead of merely sensing environmental events, they inter- 
pret them. Interpretations of events that are particularly relevant to such needs 
lead to emotions. Emotions, in turn, motivate the organism to respond to 
its environment, but allow an adaptive flexibility of response that is not avail- 
able to organisms that rely on instinct. 
A growing number of theorists from various disciplines, following the 
leads of Darwin (1872/1965), James (1890/1950), Leeper (1948), and Tom- 
kins (1963), have converged on this general view of the adaptive nature of 
emotions and their role in human experience (Arnold, 1960; D'Andrade, 1981; 
Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1982; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ells- 
worth, 1985, 1987). Our own recent research has been devoted to exploring 
some of the implications of this point of view. In particular, we have tried 
to go beyond the general statement that cognition (or appraisal, or percep- 
tion, or interpretation, or, more neutrally, information processing) is an im- 
portant component of emotion, and to ask what kinds of perceptions are 
most important in differentiating more emotional from less emotional ex- 
perience, and in differentiating one emotion from another. 
In our initial study (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) we proposed eight ap- 
praisal dimensions that we believed to be important in differentiating emo- 
tional experience: Pleasantness, Anticipated Effort, Attentional Activity, 
Certainty, Responsibility, Control, Legitimacy, and Perceived Obstacle. 
In that study we asked subjects to recall a time when they had ex- 
perienced a particular emotion, and then to rate their appraisals of that situ- 
ation along our proposed dimensions. We found that subjects had reliably 
used six orthogonal dimensions in their ratings. Four of these corresponded 
to the proposed dimensions of pleasantness, anticipated effort, attentional 
activity, and certainty. The remaining two were combinations of the pro- 
posed responsibility and control dimensions. The first dimension, human 
agency, reflected the perception that oneself or some other person was respon- 
sible for, and/or in control of, the situation. The second dimension, situa- 
tional control, reflected the perception of the situation as being controlled 
by any human being, or by impersonal circumstances. 
C E N T R A L  A N D  P E R I P H E R A L  D I M E N S I O N S  
Almost every one of the 15 emotions was characterized by a distinctive 
combination of appraisals 4 However, there were some indications that cer- 
4Shame and guilt exhibited highly similar patterns of appraisals, as did anger and contempt. 
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tain appraisals are more important in the experience of some emotions than 
others, and more important in differentiating between some classes of emo- 
tion than other classes. To take the most obvious example, appraisals of the 
pleasantness of the situation accounted for the largest proportion of the var- 
iance when all 15 emotions were considered together, but this dimension was 
relatively unimportant in differentiating among either the positive or nega- 
tive emotions. Apparently, once the situation had been appraised as basical- 
ly good or bad, other kinds of information determine which particular 
emotions a person feels. The appraisal of agency was most important in 
differentiating among the negative emotions. Shame and guilt were distin- 
guished by appraisals of self-agency; anger, contempt, and disgust by ap- 
praisals of other-agency. Sadness and, to a lesser extent, fear, were 
distinguished by strong appraisals that impersonal circumstances were con- 
trolling the situation. In addition, fear was distinguished by a high level of 
uncertainty, frustration by a high level of attention, and boredom and dis- 
gust by particularly low levels of attention. 
Although the theory is a theory of emotional experience, the first study 
was a study of remembered emotions and appraisals. Our next step was to 
examine the relations between appraisals and emotions during two actual 
emotional experiences-the anticipation of a midterm exam and the receipt 
of the exam grades (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). A majority of the students 
reported that they experienced complex blends of two or more emotions, par- 
ticularly before the exam (see also Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Izard, 1972; 
Schwartz & Weinberger, t980, on the pervasiveness of mixed emotions in 
natural settings). Nonetheless, very strong, clear, and differentiated patterns 
of appraisal were associated with the experience of specific emotions, whether 
they were pure or mixed. 
The patterns of appraisal for each emotion were very similar to those 
in the first study, but not identical. In general, the complex, immediate emo- 
tions of the midterm study were characterized by fewer appraisals than the 
pure, remembered emotions of the original study. In the original study, for 
example, anger was associated with appraisals of unpleasantness, other- 
agency, effort, and moderate certainty. In the midterm study, unpleasant- 
ness and other-agency were still highly characteristic of anger, but effort and 
certainty were not. 
These findings suggest that not all of the appraisals subjects recalled 
for "pure" experiences of single emotions are equally important. That is, 
although a given set of appraisals may be associated with typical instances 
of a particular emotion, some of these appraisals (such as high certainty and 
high effort in anger) may be subsidiary and often (e.g., during blending) will 
not be strongly associated with the emotion. In contrast, other appraisals 
(such as other-agency in anger) may be so vital to the experience of an emo- 
tion as to be considered diagnostic. 
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THE PRESENT RESEARCH: FROM A P P R A I S A L S  TO EMOTIONS 
The present research was designed to explore certain appraisals in de- 
tail, in order to shed some light on inconsistencies between the two studies 
and to explore the idea that for any given emotion, some appraisals are more 
central than others. In our previous research we have begun with an emo- 
tional situation and then asked subjects about their accompanying appraisals. 
In order to examine specific combinations of appraisals in detail (and to pro- 
vide some convergent validity), we now reversed this procedure: We asked 
people to recall situations that they had appraised in certain ways, and then 
asked them what they felt. Thus, instead of examining the patterns of ap- 
praisal associated with particular emotions, we examined the patterns of emo- 
tion associated with particular appraisals. This approach also allowed us to 
examine the relation between appraisals and emotions in the context of blends 
across a much broader range of emotional experience than was possible in 
the exam study. Because no emotional terms were used in defining the ex- 
perience, we expected that most subjects would report experiences in which 
they had felt several different emotions simultaneously (Schwartz & Wein- 
berger, 1980). 
Investigation 1: Agency and Legitimacy. In our initial study (Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), the perception of agency was fundamental in differentiat- 
ing among the unpleasant emotions, particularly anger, guilt, and sadness. 
In the exam study, however, the results were ambiguous for sadness and guilt. 
The dimension of situational control, central to the experience of sadness 
in the first study, did not emerge, presumably because none of the students 
reported feeling particularly sad. Guilt was not reliably associated with self- 
agency, possibly owing to the constraints of the setting (see Smith & Ellsworth, 
1987). Therefore, a goal of this first investigation was to test whether the 
characteristic relations between appraisals of agency and the experience of 
anger, guilt, and sadness, discovered in the initial study, would be observed 
during emotional blends when an adequate range of experience was sampled. 
Further, in our initial formulation of the theory we had postulated that 
responsibility for bringing about a situation, control of the situation as it 
developed, and the fairness or legitimacy of the outcome would all emerge 
as separate dimensions, because logically they are separate. One may be 
responsible for bringing about a situation that quickly develops beyond one's 
capacity to control it (for example, by forgetting to set the brakes on a San 
Francisco hill, or by shouting "Go, Yankees" in Fenway Park); one may also 
be able to assume control of a situation brought about by someone else (for 
example, by responding to a challenge). We had postulated legitimacy (per- 
ceived fairness) as an important dimension in the emotion of anger (see also, 
Roseman, 1984), distinct from either responsibility or control. However, our 
subjects have so far failed to distinguish so finely among dimensions; they 
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have consistently collapsed appraisals of responsibility and control into a 
single dimension of agency, and in unpleasant situations appraisals of other- 
agency and unfairness seem to be functionally synonymous. By asking sub- 
jects about situations defined by emotions rather than appraisals we may 
have biased our sample of emotional experiences toward those in which 
responsibility, control, and legitimacy were confounded. In the present study, 
we asked about these appraisals separately, hoping to unconfound them and 
discover differences in their contributions to emotional experience not dis- 
cernible by our previous methods. 
Investigation 2: Certainty. The second investigation focused on the cer- 
tainty dimension. The theory predicts that intense uncertainty should differen- 
tiate fear from the other negative emotions, and this was the case in our initial 
study (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). However, the relation between fear and 
uncertainty in the exam context was weaker than we predicted (Smith & Ell- 
sworth, 1987). In the present study, we wanted to examine whether this result 
was peculiar to the situational constraints of that study, or whether the ap- 
praisal of uncertainty is less central to the experience of fear than we had 
believed. 
Investigation 3: Attention. The third investigation was devoted to the 
dimension of attentional activity and was designed to explore our initial find- 
ing that this dimension was important in differentiating boredom and dis- 
gust (low desire to attend) from the other unpleasant emotions, and especially 
from frustration (high attentional activity). Because none of these emotions 
was common in the exam study (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987), this investiga- 
tion represents the first test of whether they are differentiated by appraisals 
of attention in the context of btends. 
METHOD 
Subjects and Overview o f  Procedure 
Subjects were 240 Stanford University undergraduates, 5 who partici- 
pated in the experiment as part of an introductory psychology course require- 
ment. Subjects were asked to recall and describe (in writing) an unpleasant 
emotional experience characterized by a particular situational appraisal (e.g., 
"describe a time when you felt that events were being determined by circum- 
stances beyond anyone's control"). They then rated their experience along 
all of the appraisal dimensions and finally indicated what emotions they felt 
5An additional 5 subjects were not included in the sample because they either reported being 
unable to recall an appropriate experience or failed to complete substantial portions of their 
questionnaires. 
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at the time. The subjects were run in small groups. Each subject was ran- 
domly assigned to one of 10 appraisal conditions with the constraint that, 
as much as possible, each condition be represented equally often within each 
session. The experiment required approximately 15 minutes and was ad- 
ministered as one of several unrelated short experiments to be completed dur- 
ing the experimental hour. 
Appraisal Conditions 
Investigation 1: Agency and Legitimacy. This was the largest of the in- 
vestigations. In it we compared six appraisals along dimensions related to 
responsibility and control. Four of these appraisals, "self-responsibility," "self- 
control," "other-responsibility," and "other-control," represented outcomes 
along the human agency dimension, which we had found to be especially 
important in differentiating between unpleasant emotions such as anger and 
guilt. We included these four cells in an attempt to discover possible differ- 
ences between appraisals of responsibility and control, and to replicate the 
findings for self- and other agency. 
These first four appraisals all represent some form of human agency 
and therefore fall on the "human agent" pole of the situational control dimen- 
sion. The fifth appraisal, "situational control," falls on the opposite end of 
this dimension and has previously emerged as a central appraisal differen- 
tiating the experience of sadness from other unpleasant states. 
The sixth appraisal, "unfair," we included to reexamine the previously 
observed close relation between appraisals of unfairness and other-agency 
by testing the extent to which situations initially defined by the appraisal of 
either unfairness or other-agency would be associated with similar patterns 
of emotion. 
Investigation 2: Certainty. This investigation consisted of two appraisals, 
"certain" and "uncertain." On the basis of our past research we predicted 
that this dimension would be important in differentiating fear (uncertain) 
from most of the other unpleasant emotions. 
Investigation 3: Attention. This investigation consisted of two ap- 
praisals, "attend" and "shut out." In light of the earlier findings we predict- 
ed that this dimension would be important for differentiating boredom and 
disgust (low attentional activity) from the other unpleasant emotions, and 
especially from frustration (high attentional activity). 
General Procedure 
On the first page of the questionnaire we asked the subject to write 
a description of a past emotional experience associated with one of the 10 
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di f ferent  appraisa ls .  F o r  example ,  the  instruct ions for  the  "self-responsibi l i ty"  
appra i sa l  were as fo l lows:  
Please try to recall a past unpleasant emotional experience when you felt responsible 
for what was happening in the situation. Try and remember as vividly as you can 
what this past situation was like: Try to think back and reexperience the emotions 
that you were feeling during this experience. Think of what happened in this situa- 
tion, whyyou felt responsible, and what it felt like to be in this particular situation . . . .  
Briefly, please describe this past unpleasant situation where you felt responsible for 
what was happening. What happened, and why did you feel thatyou were responsible? 
C o r r e s p o n d i n g  ins t ruc t ions  for  the o the r  appra i sa l s  were as fo l lows:  
Other-responsibility: "when you felt that someone else was responsible for what was 
happening." 
Self-control: "when you felt that you were in control of what was happening." 
Other control: "when you felt that someone else was in control of what was happening." 
Situational-control: "when you felt that the events were being determined by circum- 
stances beyond anyone's control." 
Unfair: "when you felt that something unfair happened to you. ''6 
Certain: "when you were certain about what was happening in the situation." 
Uncertain: "when you were uncertain about what was happening in the situation." 
Attend: "whey you felt a need to pay close attention to what was happening in the 
situation." 
Shut out: "when you felt a need to put  what was happening out o f  your mind." 
Subjec ts  descr ibed  events  tha t  were,  i f  any th ing ,  m o r e  e m o t i o n a l  and  
i m p o r t a n t  t han  the events  they  descr ibed  ora l ly  in ou r  ear l ier  research,  
a l t hough  the desc r ip t ions  were br iefer .  F o r  example ,  the  experiences includ-  
ed gett ing ar res ted  for  d r u n k  driving,  wrecking the paren t s '  car,  learning that  
a pa r en t  had  cancer ,  witnessing a r o o m m a t e  get  ser iously  in ju red  in a foot -  
bal l  game ,  having  an  a b o r t i o n ,  lying a b o u t  qua l i f ica t ions  in o rde r  to  get a 
j ob ,  the suicide o f  a f r iend,  b reak ing  up  with a boyf r i end  or  g i r l f r iend (many  
instances) ,  dea ths  o f  close fr iends and  relat ives,  and  parents  get t ing d ivorced  
o r  sepa ra ted .  
M e a s u r e s  
A f t e r  descr ib ing  the exper ience,  the  subjec t  comple t ed  two ques t ion-  
naires,  one measur ing  appra isa l s  and  the o ther  emot ions .  The emot ion  ques- 
t ionna i re  a lways  came af te r  the  appra i sa l  ques t ionna i re .  Wi th  m i n o r  
modif ica t ions  these were the same quest ionnaires used by  Smith and El lsworth 
(1987). 
6For this appraisal we did not specify that the emotional experience had to be unpleasant, but 
it always was. 
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Appraisal Questionnaire. This questionnaire consisted of 19 11-point 
scales designed to measure the dimensions of pleasantness, anticipated ef- 
fort, attentional activity, certainty, responsibility, control, legitimacy, per- 
ceived obstacle (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), and situational importance (Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1987). Table I shows the wordings of the items. The subject 
was instructed to answer each question by circling "the number that best 
describes how you felt while you were actually experiencing this past situa- 
tion (not how you felt either before or after the situation occurred)." 
Emotion Questionnaire. On this questionnaire the subject was asked 
to rate on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely) the extent to 
which each of 25 emotional adjectives (listed in Table III) described how he 
or she was feeling while "actually experiencing this past situation." The 25 
adjectives were the same ones used by Smith and Ellsworth (1987) and were 
selected to measure up to 16 potentially distinct emotions, 8 of which were 
unpleasant and 8 pleasant. 
RESULTS 
Overview 
After estimating values for missing data and reducing the data, we used 
two complementary analytic strategies to examine the relations between par- 
ticular appraisals and the experience of particular emotions. One set of ana- 
lyses examined differences in the emotions felt during experiences selected 
because they were associated with specific appraisals along a particular dimen- 
sion, or a set of closely related dimensions. In these analyses, analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) techniques were used to compare the emotions ex- 
perienced in the various cells of each of the three investigations. Finally, af- 
ter assessing the degree of emotional blending reported by individual subjects 
in all three investigations, a series of correlation/regression analyses was con- 
ducted to examine the characteristic patterns of appraisal, across all appraisal 
dimensions, associated with the experience of specific emotions. 
Data Estimation 
Because the multivariate techniques employed in this study require com- 
plete data sets, we estimated values for missing data points. Across the 10 
experimental conditions, 44 (0.96°7o) of the appraisal data points, and 17 
(0.28070) of the emotion data points were missing. The distribution of these 
points suggested that they were largely random failures to respond to individu- 
al items. Estimates for the missing values were computed using a two-step 
regression procedure. Separate analyses were run for the appraisal and emo- 
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Table 1, Internal Structure of the Nine Recovered Appraisal Scales 
1. Pleasantness M = 2.34 SD = 1.68 c~ = .77 
P l e a s a n t - H o w  pleasant or unpleasant was it to be in this 
situation? 
E n j o y - H o w  enjoyable or unenjoyable was it to be in this 
situation? 
2. Anticipated effort M = 7.82 SD = 2.23 a = .73 
Ef fo r t - -How much effort (mental or physical) did you feel 
the need to expend in this situation? 
Exert--To what extent did you feel that you needed to exert 
yourself in order to deal with this situation? 
3. Attentional activity M = 7.05 SD = 2.64 a = .73 
A t t end -Th ink  about what was happening in this situation. 
To what extent did you try to devote your attention to what 
was going on, or to think about something else? 
T h i n k - T h i n k  about what was happening in this situation. To 
what extent did you try to think about these things further, 
or to put them out of your mind? 
4. Certainty M = 6.83 SD = 2,76 c~ = .77 
S u r e - H o w  sure were you about what was happening in this 
situation? 
Unders tand-When you were in this situation, how well did you 
understand what was happening around you? 
5. Human agency M = 6.93 SD = 2.41 a = .82 
Other-responsibili ty- How responsible did you think someone 
or something other than yourself was for having brought about 
the events that were occurring in this situation? 
Self-responsibil i ty"-How responsible did you feel for having 
brought about the events that were occurring in this situation? 
Other -cont ro l -To  what extent did you feel that someone other 
than yourself was controlling what was happening in this sit- 
uation? 
Self-control"--To what extent did you feel that you could in- 
fluence what was happening in this situation? 
C h e a t e d - T o  what extent did you feel cheated or wronged in 
this situation? 
Fair " -  How fair did you think what happened to you in this 
situation was? 
6. Situational control M = 5.11 SD = 3.31 
Situational c o n t r o l - T o  what extent did you feel that circum- 
stances beyond anyone's control determined what was happen- 
ing in this situation? 
7. Perceived obstacle M = 7.81 SD = 2.24 u = .69 
P r o b l e m - T h i n k  about what you wanted in this situation. To 
what extent did you feel that there were problems that had to 
be solved before you could get what you wanted? 
Obstacle--Think about what yon wanted in this situation. To 
what extent did you feet there were obstacles standing in the 
path between you and getting what you wanted? 
8. Importance M = 9.24 SD = 2.07 
I m p o r t a n c e - H o w  important was what was happening in this 
situation to you? 
9. Predictability M = 5.18 SD = 3.08 
P red ic t -When  you were in this situation, how well could you 
predict what was going to happen? 
"The scores for this item were reversed in computing the scale scores. 
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tion data, and the entire data set, including the 61 estimated values, was em- 
ployed in all subsequent analyses. 
Recovery o f  the Appraisal and Emotion Scales 
Both the appraisal and emotion data were reduced to final sets of scales 
by examining the a priori scales designed into the questionnaires, and using 
factor analysis to examine whether any of the a priori scales within a set were 
redundant and could be combined. On the basis of these analyses, scale scores 
were computed for each subject by combining (with unit weight) the items 
loading on a scale and taking the mean (to convert the scale back to original 
units). 
Appraisal Dimensions. The reduction procedure resulted in nine ap- 
praisal scales. The items contributing to each of these scales, and their over- 
all means, standard deviations, and internal consistencies (c~'s), are listed in 
Table I. In general, these scales correspond very closely to the dimensions 
that were recovered in our previous work (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). 
Each of the six dimensions recovered in the original study (Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985) is clearly represented: pleasantness, anticipated effort, attentional 
tivity, certainty, human agency, and situational control. Two of the remain- 
ing three scales correspond to dimensions observed in the exam study (Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1987): perceived obstacle and importance. The remaining scale 
represents a new, distinct certainty dimension, predictability. In our initial 
study we suggested that the certainty dimension needed further differentia- 
tion, and the present study suggests two distinct facets of certainty: certainty 
about what is currently happening, and certainty about the outcome of the 
situation. The present study resembled the initial study, but not the exam 
study, in that the two legitimacy items failed to define a separate dimension 
but instead loaded highly on the human agency dimension. Further, these 
items were as highly correlated with the four items intended to measure agency 
(average r = .40) as the four agency items were intercorrelated with each 
other (average r = .41). Thus, as in the initial study, when unpleasant events 
were recalled, appraisals of unfairness were closely associated with those of 
other-agency. 
Examination of the overall scale means indicates that, as intended, sub- 
jects described events that they had found to be very unpleasant and, addi- 
tionally, to be very important, involving many or large goal-obstacles, and 
requiring high levels of effort. 
Intercorrelations Among the Appraisal Scales. The scales constructed 
in this study are not artificially constrained to be orthogonal. Thus, an ex- 
amination of the intercorrelations among the scales permits an examination 
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of the potential interrelations among the underlying dimensions. The inter- 
correlations among the appraisal scales are presented in Table II. Many of 
the significant correlations are familiar from previous research: The corre- 
lation of importance with high levels of attention and effort; the correlation 
of other-agency with perceptions of uncertainty, unpleasantness, and major 
obstacles; the correlation of perceived obstacles with high effort and un- 
pleasantness; and the correlations of unpleasantness and effort. These sta- 
ble relations may reflect general properties of the appraisal process, owing 
either to constraints in the structure of emotional situations or to constraints 
in the appraisal process itself. In future research a systematic examination 
of these stable interrelations may be useful in identifying the nature of such 
constraints and their implications for the appraisal process. 
Emotion Scales. The reduction procedure resulted in 12 emotion scales, 
6 representing unpleasant emotions and 6 representing pleasant ones. The 
items contributing to each of these scales, and their overall means, standard 
deviations, and internal consistencies (c~'s) are listed in Table III. The 6 un- 
pleasant emotion scales correspond to the a priori scales of anger, guilt, sad- 
ness, fear, resignation, and boredom. The one discrepancy between these 
scales and the a priori ones was that, although anger, disgust, and frustra- 
tion were conceptualized as distinct emotions (and were quite distinct in our 
original study, Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), the scales intended to measure frus- 
tration and disgust were both found to load highly on the anger factor in 
the factor analyses and thus were subsumed by the anger scale. Four of the 
6 pleasant emotion scales corresponded exactly to the a priori scales intend- 
ed to measure hope, surprise, interest, and relief. Additionally, the challenged 
item combined with the two items designed to measure pride to yield a three- 
Tab le  I I .  In te rcor re la t ions  A m o n g  the Appra i sa l  Scales g 
Appra i sa l  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 A g e n c y "  - - . 1 8  ~ - . 1 4  a - - . 1 8  e - .15 e .10 
2 Sit. con t ro l  b - . 2 0 "  - - - . 1 4  a - ,11 .18 e 
3 Cer ta in ty  ,251 . I 0  . . . .  
4 Predic t  c - - - ,13 d - 
5 A t t en t ion  - .27 s - .25 I 
6 P leasantness  - . 2 4  s - . 1 8  ~ .44 f 
7 E f f o r t  .22 f .47"* 
8 Obs tac le  ,34 y 
9 I m p o r t a n c e  
~ H u m a n  agency.  Scores for  this scale increase in the d i rec t ion  o f  other-agency. 
bSituat ional  cont ro l .  
~Predictabil i ty.  
~p < .05. 
~p < .01. 
~p < .001. 
gFor clari ty o f  presenta t ion ,  corre la t ions  less than  .10 have  been omi t ted .  
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Table IlL Internal Structure of the 12 Recovered Emotion Scales" 
1. Anger M = 4.98 SD = 2.12 a = .88 
Angry, scornful, contemptuous, resentful, disgusted, frustrated 
2. Guilt M = 3.53 SD = 2.44 c~ = .77 
Guilty, ashamed 
3. Sadness M = 5.89 SD = 2.67 
Sad 
4. Fear M = 5.20 SD = 2.43 a = .72 
Nervous, afraid 
5. Resignation M = 3.53 SD = 2.45 
Resigned 
6. Hope M = 3.50 SD = 2.18 c~ = .74 
Hopeful, expectant 
7. Challenge/Pride M = 3.06 SD = 1.75 c~ = .66 
Challenged, confident, proud 
8. Surprise M = 4.93 SD = 2.62 
Surprised 
9. Interest M = 4.85 SD = 2.93 
Interested 
10. Happiness M = 1.43 SD = 0.89 a = .68 
Happy, elated, amused 
11. Boredom M--- 1.89 SD = 1.37 c~ = .59 
Bored, apathetic 
12. Relief M = 1.80 SD = 1.73 
Relieved 
"The adjectives listed under each scale name are the emotional adjec- 
tives that contributed to that scale with unit weighting. The last three 
scales (Happiness, Boredom, and Relief) were not retained for fur- 
ther analysis. See text for explanation. 
item challenge/pride scale, and the amused i tem combined with the two items 
intended to measure happiness to yield a three-i tem happiness scale. Of  these 
12 scales, happiness ,  relief, and  bo redom were dropped  f rom fur ther  con- 
s iderat ion because they each had means  and  s tandard  deviat ions less than  
2 (on scales ranging  f rom 1 to 9), indicat ing that  the subjects in this study 
almost  never reported experiencing them.  
Intercorrelations A m o n g  the Emot ion  Scales. As with the appraisal  
scales, the emot ion  scales were no t  necessarily or thogonal ,  and  an  examina-  
t ion of  the intercorrela t ions  among  them offers a pre l iminary  view of  the 
emot iona l  b lending in the s i tuat ion the subjects described. Table  IV reveals 
a n u m b e r  of s ignif icant  correlat ions,  providing suppor t  for the claim that  
under  m a n y  condi t ions  emot ions  occur in complex blends (e.g., F o l k m a n  
& Lazarus,  1985; Izard,  1972; Smith & Ellsworth,  1987; Schwartz & Wein-  
berger,  1980). For  instance,  sadness and  fear were very likely to cooccur,  
as were hope,  interest,  and  chal lenge/pr ide .  Interest ingly,  with the excep- 
t ion of resignation and  challenge/pride,  which are negatively correlated, there 
is a general absence of significant negative correlations among  the emotions.  
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E m o t i o n  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 A n g e r  --  . I 5  c --  .12 - . 1 1  ,11 .20 a - 
2 G u i l t  - -  .23 ~ - -  - -  - . I 1  - - 
3 S a d n e s s  .34 ~ .15 c - -  - . 1 2  --  .13 c 
4 F e a r  - -  .26 e - -  .15 c .21 ~ 
5 R e s i g n a t i o n  - -  - . I 4  c - -  --  
6 H o p e  .44" --  .34 ~ 
7 C h a l l e n g e  b - .25 e 
8 S u r p r i s e  .27 e 
9 I n t e r e s t  
~For  c l a r i t y  o f  p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  c o r r e l a t i o n s  less t h a n  .10 h a v e  b e e n  o m i t t e d .  
b C h a l l e n g e / P r i d e .  
Cp < .05. 
~p < .01. 
"p < .001. 
This result indicates that, in general, the presence of any particular emotion 
did not preclude the experience of most of the other emotions. 
Investigation 1: Agency and Legitimacy 
Analytic Strategy. The six ceils constituting this investigation were select- 
ed to investigate differences in the emotions associated with appraisals along 
the agency dimensions. These differences were examined using six a priori 
contrasts designed to examine specific questions of theoretical interest (Rosen- 
thai & Rosnow, 1985). The first two comparisons were designed to replicate 
the previous findings. The first contrasted the two self-agency cells (self- 
responsibility and self-control) with the two other-agency cells (other- 
responsibility and other-control). We predicted that guilt would be ex- 
perienced in the self-agency cells, and anger in the other-agency cells. The 
second contrast, orthogonal to the first, pitted the situational control cell 
against all four human agency ceils. We expected relatively high levels of 
sadness, and relatively low levels of anger and guilt, to be associated with 
appraisals of situational control. 
The four remaining contrasts were more exploratory. Two of these, 
which were orthogonat to the above two contrasts and to each other, were 
used to investigate differences between two potentially distinct facets of agen- 
cy: responsibility and control. One contrasted the self-responsibility and self- 
control cells, and the other contrasted the other-responsibility and other- 
control cells. No specific predictions were advanced for these contrasts. Fi- 
nally, two contrasts were used to examine the relations between appraisals 
of unfairness and other-agency. The first contrasted the unfair cell with the 
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Table V. Appraisal and Emotion Means for Investigation 1 h 
Condition 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Setf-res" Self-con b Other-res ~ Other-con a Sit-con e Unfair 
(24) t (25) (25) (25) (24) (24) 
Appraisal scales 
Human agency 5.33 4.61 8.20 8.35 8.01 8.82 
Situational control 5.04 4.33 4.28 3.60 7.96 3.38 
Certainty 6.22 7.90 6.62 7.20 6.48 7.21 
Predictability 4.28 6.83 4.92 6.08 4.52 3.88 
Attention 6.62 8.08 7.06 7.32 7.11 6.21 
Pleasantness 2.50 3.19 2.44 2.32 t.80 2.12 
Effort 7.66 8.60 7.52 8.20 7.57 7.31 
Obstacle 7.64 7.63 7.06 8.36 8.83 7.06 
Importance 8.52 8.63 8.56 9.60 9.78 8.42 
Emotion scales 
Anger 4.63 4.39 5.76 5.83 4.96 6.47 
Guilt 5.82 4.17 3.38 2.56 3.04 2.27 
Sadness 5.96 5.13 5.28 5.64 6.91 4.75 
Fear 5.40 4.75 5.42 5.00 5.74 3.21 
Resignation 2.76 2.96 3.68 4.32 4.39 3.33 
Hope 4.28 2.88 3.62 4.04 3.41 2.83 
Challenge g 3.13 3.57 2.97 3.41 2.57 3.15 
Surprise 5.12 3.91 6.40 3.96 5.30 5.17 






/Numbers in parentheses are the cell n's. 
*Challenge/pride. 
hFor the appraisal scales, scores increase in the direction of other-agency, and higher levels of 
situational control, certainty, predictability, attention to the situation, pleasantness, anticipated 
effort, and perceived obstacles, respectively. For all of the emotion scales, higher scores indi- 
cate increased levels of that emotion. 
two other-agency cells, and  the second contrasted the unfa i r  cell with the 
two self-agency cells. We expected that  the un fa i r  cell would  be very simi- 
lar to the other-agency cells. Tha t  is, few differences were expected in the 
former contrast ,  while the latter one was expected to reveal differences simi- 
lar to those of  the self-agency versus other-agency contrast .  
Each contras t  was per formed separately on  the appraisal  and  emot ion  
data.  The analyses of  the appraisal  data  served as m a n i p u l a t i o n  checks to 
conf i rm that  the appraisals  varied across the cells in  the in tended  ways. In  
addi t ion ,  these analyses indicated the extent to which the cells differed sys- 
tematical ly a long appraisal  d imens ions  tha t  were no t  specifically man ipu la t -  
ed in the exper imental  design. As will become apparent ,  several such 
differences were found,  representing appraisal confounds  that  potentially ob- 
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Contrast 
Self vs. Human vs. Self-res Other res Unfair Unfair 
other situation vs. con vs. con vs. other vs. self 
1,2 vs. 3,4 1,2,3,4 vs. 5 1 vs. 2 3 vs. 4 6 vs. 3,4 6 vs. 1,2 
Appraisal scales 
Multivariate 9.75 ~ 5.87 e 2.04 ~ -- 1.39 9.85 e 
Agency 82.32 e 11.04 a 1.91 -- t .47 72.76" 
Situational control 1.65 29.59 ~ - -- - 3.31 
Certainty -- -- 4.81 ~ -- -- -- 
Predict -- 2.25 9.52 a 2,01 5.10 c 5.4Y 
Attention -- - 3.75 -- 2.23 3.01 
Pleasant 1.81 4.13 ¢ 1.97 -- 1.59 -- 
Effort -- - 1.75 -- - 1.73 
Obstacle - 5.47 c - 4.64" 1.49 1.15 
Importance 1.24 3.33 - 2,64 1.39 -- 
Emotion scales 
Multivariate 4.97 * 1.69 2.30 c 1.85 2.04" 6.88 e 
Anger 10.94 ~ - - - 2.00 16.64 e 
Guilt 22.05 ~ 3.58 7.29 a 1,83 1.73 25.998 
Sadness - 5.20 ~ 1.19 - 1.14 1.42 
Fear -- 1.17 -- -- 11.4& 9.90 a 
Resignation 5.08 ~ 2.72 - -- 1.14 - 
Hope -- - 5.14 ~ -- 3.43 1.90 
Challenge b - 2.94 . . . .  
Surprise 1.68 - 2.75 I 1.56 e -- 1.05 
Interest . . . . . .  
~Alt the multivariate £'s have 9 and 132 d f  All of the univariate F's have 1 and t40 df For 
clarity of presentation, all F s  < 1 have been omitted. 
bChallenge/pride. 
Cp < .05. 
ap < .01. 
ep < .001. 
s c u r e  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  e m o t i o n  c o n t r a s t  r e s u l t s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  o r d e r  
t o  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  c o n t r o l  f o r  t h e s e  c o n f o u n d s ,  e a c h  o f  t h e  e m o t i o n  c o n t r a s t s  
r e p o r t e d  b e l o w  ( f o r  al l  t h r e e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s )  w a s  p e r f o r m e d  a s e c o n d  t i m e  
w i t h  t h e  s c o r e s  a l o n g  al l  o f  t h e  a p p r a i s a l  d i m e n s i o n s  e x c e p t  t h e  o n e  o f  d i r e c t  
i n t e r e s t  e n t e r e d  a s  c o v a r i a t e s .  B e c a u s e  e n t e r i n g  t h e  c o v a r i a t e s  r a r e l y  a f f e c t -  
e d  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  a n a l y s e s ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  s i m p l e  c o n t r a s t s  a r e  
r e p o r t e d  b e l o w .  H o w e v e r ,  i n  t h o s e  c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e  t w o  a n a l y s e s  y i e l d e d  s u b -  
s t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  f i n d i n g s ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  b o t h  a r e  p r e s e n t e d .  T h e  a p p r a i s a l  
a n d  e m o t i o n  m e a n s  f o r  t h e  s ix  ce i l s  o f  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
T a b l v e  V ,  a n d  t h e  F r a t i o s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p l a n n e d  c o m p a r i s o n s  a r e  
p r e s e n t e d  in  T a b l e  V I .  
Self-Agency Versus Other-Agency. T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  c o n t r a s t  c o m p a r -  
i n g  s e l f - a g e n c y  w i t h  o t h e r - a g e n c y  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  in  t h e  f i r s t  c o l u m n  o f  T a b l e  
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VI. Analysis of the appraisal data indicated that the cells differed, as intended, 
along the human agency dimension; Table V reveals that the two self-agency 
cells were associated with clear appraisals of self-agency (combined M = 
4.96), and the two other-agency cells were associated with strong appraisals 
of other-agency (combined M = 8.28). None of the other appraisal differ- 
ences reached significance. Examination of the emotion data indicates that 
the self-agency and other-agency cells differed significantly in their associat- 
ed levels of anger and guilt as predicted: Significantly higher levels of anger 
were reported in the two other-agency cells (combined M = 5.80) than in 
the two self-agency cells (combined M = 4.51), while, conversely, higher 
levels of guilt were experienced in the two self-agency cells (combined M = 
5.00) than in the two other-agency cells (combined M = 2.97). Subjects also 
reported experiencing significantly higher levels of resignation under condi- 
tions of other-agency (combined M = 4.00) than under conditions of self- 
agency (combined M = 2.86). 
Human Agency versus Situational Control. The results of the contrast 
comparing human agency and situational control appears in the second 
column of Table VI. Examination of  Tables V and VI indicates that, as in- 
tended, appraisals of situational control were much stronger in the situational 
control cells (M = 7.96) than in the four human agency cells (combined M 
= 4.30). However, the appraisal of situational control was partially con- 
founded with appraisals along other dimensions. Relative to the four hu- 
man agency cells, the situations described in the situational control cell were 
appraised as involving more other-agency (M = 8.01 versus combined M 
= 6.62), being less pleasant (M = 1.80 versus combined M = 2.61), involv- 
ing greater obstacles (M = 8.83 versus combined M = 7.67), and tending 
to be more important (M = 9.78 versus combined M = 8.82). 
As predicted, subjects in the situational control cell reported experienc- 
ing higher levels of sadness (M = 6.91 versus combined M = 5.50), and 
tended to experience lower levels of guilt (M = 3.00 versus combined M = 
3.98; F(1, 140) = 3.58, p = .06) than subjects in the four human agency 
conditions. However, contrary to predictions, the levels of  anger reported 
in the situational control cell (M = 4.96) and the four human agency cells 
(combined M = 5.15) did not differ significantly. The absence of this predict- 
ed difference was most likely due to the partial confound between appraisals 
of situational control and (human) other-agency in the situational control 
cell. When all of the appraisal scales except situational control were entered 
as covariates, the predicted difference in anger emerged; the adjusted level 
of anger in the situational control cell (adjusted M = 4.49) was less than 
that in the combined four human agency cells (adjusted M = 5.39; F(1,132) 
= 4.70, p < .05). 
However, entering these appraisal scales as covariates also removed the 
predicted difference in sadness between the situational control (adjusted M 
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= 6.19) and human agency conditions (adjusted combined M = 5.52; F(1, 
132) = 1.09, p = .28). Follow-up analyses indicated that this result was due 
to the combined effects of appraisals of  pleasantness, perceived obstacle, 
and importance (but, notably, not human agency), which were partially con- 
founded with the appraisals of  situational control. Entering all of  the ap- 
praisal scales expect these three and situational control as covariates did not 
significantly alter the predicted difference (situational control M = 6.98, com- 
bined human agency M = 5.42; F(1,  135) = 5.95, p < .05); however, en- 
tering any one of the scales of  pleasantness, perceived obstacle, or importance 
reduce the difference to a trend (F's(1, 139) = 2.59 to 2.86, p's = .09 to 
• 11). Entering just the situational control scale as a covariate essentially re- 
moved the predicted difference (F(1, 139) = 1.12, p = .21). These results 
suggest that the high levels of  sadness in the situational control condition 
may not have been due to situational control per se but may have been due 
instead to some closely related property of  the situations described in that 
condition that was also related to appraisals of  unpleasantness, importance, 
and high perceived obstacles. 
Responsibility versus Control The results of  the two contrasts examin- 
ing differences between appraisals of  responsibility and control are present- 
ed in the third and fourth columns of  Table VI. Although we sampled 
experiences associated with appraisals of  responsibility and of  control 
separately, the items intended to measure responsibility and control loaded 
on a single human agency dimension, as they had in our previous studies, 
indicating that appraisals of responsibility and control are generally correlat- 
ed. Even though the presence of  this relationship in our data minimizes the 
chances of  observing possible differences in the emotions associated primar- 
ily with the two appraisals, the contrasts reveal some systematic differences. 
First, subjects were generally more certain about their circumstances 
when they described experiences associated with appraisals of self-control 
than those of self-responsibility; relative to subjects in the self-responsibility 
cell, those in the self~control cell reported both that their situations were more 
predictable (M = 6.83 versus M = 4.28), and that they were more certain 
about  what was happening (M = 7.90 versus M = 6.22). Under conditions 
of  other-agency, subjects reported higher perceived obstacles when some- 
one else was in control of  the situation (M = 8.36) than when someone else 
was seen as responsible for the situation (M = 7.06). The emotion analyses 
indicated that in the self-responsibility condition subjects experienced higher 
levels of  both guilt (M = 5.82 versus M = 4.t7) and hope (M = 4.28 versus 
M = 2.88) than those in the self-control condition. Situations associated with 
appraisals of  other-responsibility yielded stronger feelings of  surprise (M = 
6.40) than situations associated with appraisals of  other-control (M = 3.96). 
Unfairness versus Other-Agency and Self-Agency. The last two columns 
of  Table VI present the results of  the contrasts comparing the situations as- 
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sociated with appraisals of  unfairness with those associated with appraisals 
of other-agency and of self-agency, respectively. In general, these analyses 
support the hypothesis that for unpleasant experiences appraisals of  other- 
agency and unfairness are functionally similar; very few differences emerged 
between the unfair and other-agency ceils, and the differences between the 
unfair and self-agency cells largely mirrored those between the other- and 
self-agency cells. As in the other-agency cells, subjects in the unfair cell report- 
ed strong appraisals of  other-agency (M = 8.82 versus combined M = 4.97), 
high anger (M = 6.47 versus combined M = 4.51), and low guilt (M = 2.27 
versus combined M = 5.00), relative to those in the self-agency cells. In- 
terestingly, subjects in the unfair cell appraised their situations as less predic- 
Table VII. Appraisal and Emotion Means and Planned Comparisons for Investigations 2 and 3 h 
Investigation 2 Investigation 3 
Certain Uncertain Attend Shut out 
(24y (24) F ~ (22) (24) /¢' 
Appraisal scales 
Multivariate 3.01 s 1.88 ~ 
Human agency 6.53 6.63 - 5.95 6.76 1.56 
Situational control 5.04 6.17 1.36 5.18 6.33 1.28 
Certainty 8.27 5.1'5 18.268 6.52 6.69 - 
Predictability 6.13 4.25 3.89 6.05 4.88 1.88 
Attention 6.56 7.65 2.26 8.07 5.88 8.64 s 
Pleasantness 1.71 1.83 - 2.55 2.08 - 
Effort 7.85 8.00 - 7.91 7.56 - 
Obstacle 8.25 7.73 - 7.07 8.44 3.64 
Importance 9.46 10.13 1.97 9.68 9.75 -- 
Emotional scales 
Multivariate - -- 
Anger 4.69 3.90 1.86 4.17 4.90 1.26 
Guilt 3.94 3.50 - 3.23 3.27 - 
Sadness 5.92 6.33 - 6.05 7.00 1.71 
Fear 5.08 6.15 2.54 5.25 6.06 1.47 
Resignation 3.83 2.92 1.86 3.27 3.88 - 
Hope 3.02 4.00 2.57 3.50 3.31 -- 
Challenge a 2.94 2.89 -- 3.12 2.78 - 
Surprise 4.83 4.67 - 4.68 5.21 - 
Interest 4.46 5.92 3.56 5.64 4.50 1.74 
~In Investigation 2 all multivariate F 's  have dfof  (9, 38), and all univariate F's have dfof  (1, 46). 
bin Investigation 3 all multivariate F's have dfof  (9, 36), and all univariate F's have dfof  (t,  44). 
CNumbers in parentheses are the cell n's. 
dChallenge/pride. 
~p < .05. 
~p < .Ol. 
gp < .001. 
hFor the appraisal scales, scores increase in the direction of other-agency, and higher levels of 
situational control, certainty, predictability, attention to the situation, pleasantness, anticipated 
effort, and perceived obstacles, respectively. For all of that emotion components, higher scores 
indicate increased levels of that emotion. For clarity of presentation, all F's < 1 have been omitted. 
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table (M = 3.88 versus combined M = 5.53) but reported experiencing 
substantially less fear (M = 3.21 versus combined M = 5.14) than subjects 
in any of  human-agency cells. The finding for fear indicates that appraisals 
of  legitimacy and agency are not equivalent. The reduced fear in the unfair 
cell is consistent with a proposal by Roseman (1984) that the appraisal of  
an unpleasant situation as undeserved confers a sense of  moral strength, or 
power, upon the person (which in turn reduces the likelihood of  being fear- 
ful) that is not necessarily conferred by appraising someone else as responsi- 
ble for, and /o r  in control of, the situation. 
Investigation 2: Certainty 
The appraisal and emotion means for the certain and uncertain cells, 
as well as the results of  the comparisons of  these cells, are presented in Ta- 
ble VII. Examination of the appraisal data indicates that, as intended, the 
situations described in the certainty cell were associated with substantially 
stronger appraisals of  certainty (M = 8.27) than those described in the un- 
certain cell (M = 5.15). In addition, higher levels of  predictability were report- 
ed in the certain cell (M = 6.13) than in the uncertain cell (P,//= 4.25; F(1, 
46) = 3.89,p = .05). However, contrary to predictions, there were no relia- 
ble differences in the emotions experienced in the two cells. In particular, 
although the means are in the predicted direction, subjects in the uncertain 
cell did not report experiencing significantly more fear (M = 6.15) than sub- 
jects in the certain cell (M = 5.08; F(1, 46) = 2.54, p = .12). 
Investigation 3: Attentional Activity 
The appraisal and emotion means for the attend and shut out cells, as 
well as the results of  the comparisons of  these cells, are also presented in 
Table VII. As intended, the experiences reported in the attend cell were as- 
sociated with substantially greater levels of  attentional activity (M -- 8.07) 
than those reported in the shut out cell (M = 5.88; F(1, 44) = 8.64, p < 
.01). In addition, the experiences in the shut out cell tended to be associated 
with greater perceived obstacles (M = 8.44) than those in the attend cell (M 
= 7.07; F(1, 44) = 3.64, p = .06). However, none of  the emotions differed 
across the two conditions. One possible reason for this may be that the items 
intended to measure the two emotions expected to be most strongly affected 
by appraisals of  attentional activity, disgust and frustration, were both sub- 
sumed by the anger scale, and thus, systematic effects due to attention may 
have canceled one another out. However, separate analyses of  the frustra- 
tion and disgust items provided no support for the predictions. In fact, con- 
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t rary to predictions, subjects reported experiencing significantly higher levels 
of  frustration in the shut out cell (M = 7.50) than in the attend cell (M = 
5.13; F(1, 44) = 9.71, p < .01). Thus, for the unpleasant experiences exa- 
mined in this investigation, selecting experiences based on differences in at- 
tention did not particularly distinguish the emotions that subjects reported 
experiencing. 
Single States or Mixed Emotions? 
One reason for defining the situations in terms of appraisals rather than 
in terms of particular emotions was to allow subjects to describe situations 
in which they had experienced mixed emotions. In order to assess the degree 
to which subjects reported feeling single or mixed emotions, we coded a sub- 
ject as experiencing a particular emotion if his or her score for the appropri-  
ate emotion was at or above the scale midpoint (i.e., was 5 or greater). 7 Using 
this criterion, we found that sadness (N = 174), fear (N  = 133), interest 
(N = 133), surprise (N = 132), and anger (N = 118) were each experienced 
by roughly half or more of  the subjects; resignation (N = 73), guilt (N = 
69), and hope (?4 = 65) were experienced by between a quarter and a third 
of  the subjects; and challenge/pride (N = 40) was experienced by a sixth 
of  the subjects. 
Examination of the patterns of  emotions experienced by individual sub- 
jects indicated substantial emotional blending. Only 15 (6.3%) of  the sub- 
jects were coded as experiencing a single, unblended emotion. The mean 
number  of  emotions reported by each subject was 3.90; almost two-thirds 
of  the subjects (N = 153) were coded as experiencing three, four, or five 
emotions; and each of  the unpleasant emotions (i.e., anger, fear, guilt, sad- 
ness, and resignation) combined with each of  the other unpleasant emotions 
more than 25 %0 of  the time it was experienced (but not necessarily with all 
of  them simultaneously). 
Patterns of  Appraisal Characterizing the Individual Emotions 
The characteristic patterns of  appraisal associated with the experience 
of  the individual emotions were examined via simple correlations between 
7This is the same conservative coding strategy we used previously (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). 
Obviously a less conservative criterion would have revealed even more blending than we report. 
Because the purpose of this analysis was to test for clear evidence of blending, we felt that 
a conservative strategy was called for. It should be noted that our choice of criterion affected 
only our qualitative description of the subjects' patterns of blending; it in no way affected the 
results of the regression analyses, 
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the appraisals and the emotions, and a series of nine multiple regression ana- 
lyses. In each of the latter, the scale score for a single emotion was regressed 
on the nine appraisal scales using the combined data from all three investi- 
gations (N = 240). The results of both the correlation and regression ana- 
lyses are presented in Table VIII. 
Both sets of analyses indicated highly characteristic patterns of appraisal 
for all of the emotions except hope. These patterns were largely consistent 
with our previous studies (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). In line with the 
results of Investigation 1, sadness, anger, and guilt were highly differentiat- 
ed by appraisals along the two agency dimensions. Both the correlation and 
regression analyses indicated that sadness was reliably predicted by appraisals 
of situational control, guilt by the perception of oneself as agent, and anger 
by perceptions of some other person as agent. The experience of anger was 
further predicted by appraisals of extreme unpleasantness and substantial 
obstacles; the experience of sadness shared the appraisals of unpleasantness 
and obstacles, and was also predicted by the perceived importance of the 
situation; and guilt was associated with a desire to shut out what was hap- 
pening in the situation. 
Although the manipulation of certainty in Investigation 2 did not result 
in the predicted differences in fear, fear was associated with appraisals of 
uncertainty in both the correlation and regression analyses. It was also gener- 
ally associated with appraisals of perceived obstacles and importance. The 
experience of resignation was predicted by appraisals that the situation had 
a predictable outcome, and that little effort was anticipated. The experience 
of challenge/pride was generally associated with appraisals of relative 
pleasantness, certainty about the situation, high levels of attentional activi- 
ty, and high anticipated effort. Surprise was associated with appraisals that 
the situation was unpredictable and due to someone else. Finally, interest 
was generally associated with a desire to attend to a situation perceived as 
important. 
DISCUSSION 
A primary purpose of this study was to examine relations between ap- 
praisals and emotions in the context of emotional blending across a broad 
range of emotional situations. Our experimental design permitted us to exa- 
mine the appraisal/emotion relations in two convergent ways; the results of 
both kinds of analysis indicated strong relations between our subjects' ap- 
praisals of their circumstances and the emotions they felt and, further, iden- 
tified particular appraisals as being especially important in the experience 
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The results of Investigation 1 strongly affirmed the importance of agency 
in the differentiation of anger, guilt, and sadness. As predicted, the report- 
ed levels of anger were strongest when subjects described unpleasant situa- 
tions in which they had attributed agency to someone else; guilt was highest 
when they described situations in which they had attributed agency to them- 
selves. These results were not changed by statistically controlling the ap- 
praisals along other dimensions. In addition, subjects reported experiencing 
considerably more sadness when they attributed the unpleasant situation to 
impersonal circumstances than when they saw it as caused by some human 
agent (either oneself or someone else). However, the analyses of covariance 
indicated that as an alternative to situational control, this difference was at- 
tributable to the combined appraisals of unpleasantness, high obstacles, and 
importance. This result suggests that the increased sadness in the situational 
control condition may have been due to some appraisal closely related, but 
not identical, to situational con t ro l - a  possibility that will be considered 
below. 
As anticipated, the vast majority of subjects reported experiencing mixed 
emotions. Regression analyses of the patterns of appraisal associated with 
the experience of individual emotions in this context of blending indicated 
clear relations between the experience of specific emotions and particular 
patterns of appraisal, highly similar to those we observed previously (Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). For instance, in line with the results of Investiga- 
tion 1, the regression analyses clearly replicated the associations between sad- 
ness and appraisals of situational control, anger and appraisals of (human) 
other-agency, and guilt and appraisals of self-agency (and low attentional 
activity). In addition, further paralleling the findings of our original study, 
fear was predicted by appraisals of low certainty, surprise was associated 
with unpredictable situations appraised as due to someone else, interest was 
predicted by appraisals of high attentional activity, and challenge/pride was 
associated with high levels of both attention and certainty. 
Nevertheless, the patterns of appraisal characterizing the individual emo- 
tions in this study were not identical to those observed in our original study 
of pure emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For example, in the original 
study anger and interest were both associated with moderate levels of cer- 
tainty, and interest was further associated with moderate levels of both an- 
ticipated effort and situational control; guilt and fear were both associated 
with high levels of anticipated effort; sadness with appraisals of low atten- 
tional activity, moderately low certainty, and other-agency; surprise with ap- 
praisals of pleasantness, low effort, and high attention; and challenge and 
pride with appraisals of self-agency. None of these relations were observed 
in the present study. 
These discrepancies support the hypothesis that not all of the appraisals 
typically associated with relatively pure instances of a given emotion are equal- 
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ly important to the experience of that emotion. Thus, although the experience 
of sadness may typically involve a desire to shut out the situation, and 
although surprise may often be evoked under pleasant circumstances, the 
present findings indicate that it is quite possible to feet sad under conditions 
in which one wants to attend closely to the situation, or to be surprised by 
unexpected unpleasant events. Further, the dimensions reliably associated 
with particular emotions vary considerably from emotion to emotion. Thus, 
appraisals of agency are central to the experience of anger, guilt, and sad- 
ness but are not as important to the experience of the other emotions we 
examined. Appraisals of uncertainty are important in the experience of fear; 
high attentional activity is central to the experience of interest; effort, atten- 
tion, and certainty are important to the experience of challenge/pride; and 
appraisals along the predictability dimension are important in the experience 
of resignation and surprise. 
The fact that appraisals along any one dimension are more central to 
the experience of some emotions than of others may partially underlie the 
prevalence of emotional blending we and others (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 
1985; Izard, 1972; Schwartz & Weinberger, 1980; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987) 
have observed (see Scherer, 1984, for a similar proposal). Appraisals along 
certain dimensions are likely to be accompanied by the experience of a par- 
ticular emotion, while other appraisals along other dimensions are likely to 
be accompanied by the experience of different emotions; emotional blend- 
ing often may occur when appraisals central to different emotions, along 
different dimensions, cooccur. For instance, given unpleasant circumstances, 
we would expect that if the person appraises someone else as being responsi- 
ble for the situation, then the person would likely feel angry. If the situation 
is also unexpected, then we would predict the person to feel both surprised 
and angry; conversely, if the person sees the situation as having been inevita- 
ble, then the anger might blend with a feeling of resignation. If the person 
feels uncertain about some aspect of the situation, then the anger might also 
blend with fear. 
Central Appraisals and Adaptive Functions 
Why do certain appraisals bear special relations to particular emotions? 
One theoretical reason is that such appraisals have important implications 
for the person's well-being, and that the emotions associated with these ap- 
praisals prepare the person to cope adaptively with these implications. Each 
emotion is hypothesized to serve a particular set of adaptive functions: Anger 
prepares and motives the person to attack and remove an irritant or obsta- 
cle; fear prepares and motivates the person to flee a danger; sadness serves 
as an appeal for support when the person is helpless; and guilt motivates 
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the person to adhere to personal and social norms, and to behave in a respon- 
sible manner when faced with temptations to do otherwise (cf. Cannon, 1927, 
1929; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman, 1980; Plutchik, 1980). In 
this light, it is important to compare the appraisals we have found to be cen- 
tral to the experience of particular emotions with the functions those emo- 
tions are believed to serve. Our discussion deals only with unpleasant emotions 
because they were the focus of the study. 
Anger-Perceived Obstacle and Other-Agency. Anger is the emotion 
of "fight" or attack (e.g., Cannon, 1929; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Tom- 
kins, 1963). The proposed function of anger is to prepare and motivate the 
person to remove an obstacle to his or her well-being from the environment. 
Thus, it makes sense that one of the appraisals central to anger is the per- 
ception of a goal-obstacle. Further, if anger-motivated attempts to remove 
the obstacle are to be successful, they should be directed at the source of 
irritation, and this source should be something that the person has the poten- 
tial to influence and change. A human agent can be intimidated by angry 
behavior; against impersonal forces the same behavior is likely to be fruit- 
less. Functionally, therefore, it makes considerable sense that the experience 
of anger is closely associated with the appraisal that an unpleasant situation 
is due to human agents other than oneself. This appraisal allows the person 
to direct his or her efforts toward a likely target, and, because this target 
is human, it is often possible for the person to influence and improve the 
situation. 
Guilt-Perceived Obstacle and Self-Agency. Izard (1977) has proposed 
that the experience of guilt is important both in the development of one's 
conscience and in the maintenance of social order. Guilt serves to hold the 
person accountable for his or her actions. People who feel guilty may often 
castigate themselves (Wallington, 1973) and are often motivated to make repa- 
ration for any harm brought about by their behavior (e.g., Cartsmith & Gross, 
1969; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Kone~ni, 1972; Regan, Williams, 
& Sparling, 1972). Self-punishment reduces the likelihood that the unaccept- 
able behavior will recur, and attempts to repair the damages tend to restore 
social harmony. Clearly, the conditions under which such guilt-motivated 
actions are most appropriate are when the person has done something to cause 
or perpetuate an unpleasant situation (i.e., has introduced goal-obstacles to 
the situation). Thus the functional relation between guilt and appraisals of 
self-agency (under unpleasant circumstances involving obstacles) is obvious. 
Given this functional relation, the differences between appraisals of self- 
responsibility and self-control in the experience of guilt, suggested by the 
results of Investigation 1, are intriguing. They suggest that it is not so much 
whether one can influence what is happening in an unpleasant situation, but 
whether one feels personally responsible or blameworthy, that is central to 
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the experience of guilt. McGraw (1987) has similarly found attributions of 
self-blame to be much more closely related to guilt than attributions of self- 
causality. Thus, techniques that minimize attributions of personal account- 
ability are often effective in inducing people to perform behaviors they would 
otherwise find reprehensible (e.g., Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, t970); these 
techniques minimize the guilt associated with such actions. The current find- 
ings, combined with those of McGraw (1987), suggest that the conceptual 
distinction between responsibility and control should be maintained, even 
though the two are highly correlated. 
Fear-Perceived Obstacles and Uncertainty? Fear is the emotion of 
"flight" (e.g., Cannon, 1929; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Tomkins, 1963). 
Fear prepares and motivates the person to escape danger. Consistent with 
this function, fear is associated with appraisals of obstacles, indicating that 
the situation is one that seems harmful to one's well-being. In addition, fear 
is also associated with appraisals of uncertainty. However, this latter rela- 
tion is not as clear as it might be: Although uncertainty was important both 
in the regression analyses and in our original study (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), 
the direct manipulation of certainty in Investigation 2 did not produce the 
predicted differences in fear. 
We suspect that these discrepant results indicate that the certainty dimen- 
sion needs to be refined. We have already distinguished between predictabil- 
ity of the outcome and certainty about the present situation. The regression 
results indicate that of the two, uncertainty about the present situation is 
more closely related to fear than the situation's predictability. However, not 
all kinds of uncertainty about the present situation are likely to be helpful 
in assessing whether it is dangerous. Instead, more specific appraisals, directly 
related to coping, such as uncertainty about the person's ability to escape 
or to deal with the threat, are most likely to be emotionally relevant. We 
suspect that uncertainty about coping is very important in the experience of 
fear and is captured to some extent by the certainty items on the appraisal 
questionnaire, but that it may' not have been the type of certainty manipu- 
lated in Investigation 2 (subjects were asked to recall experiences when they 
"were (un)certain about what was happening in the situation"). 
Sadness- Perceived Obstacles and Situational Control? The results for 
sadness, like fear, were a little ambiguous. As predicted, subjects in the situ- 
ational control condition (Investigation 1) reported experiencing more sad- 
ness than those in the other conditions, and in the regression analyses 
appraisals of situational control were reliable predictors of sadness. Neverthe- 
less, the covariance analyses suggested that some dimension other than situ- 
ational control may be central to experience of sadness, and a consideration 
of the theoretical functions served by sadness suggests a candidate for this 
appraisal. 
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Sadness serves as an appeal for aid under conditions in which the per- 
son is helpless. The expression of distress is a signal that something is very 
wrong with the person's situation, and it is often effective in eliciting help 
and concern from others (Izard, 1977), which in turn often makes the harm 
or loss easier to bear and helps to reintegrate the individual into a social net- 
work (e.g., Cohen, Sherrod, & Clark, 1986; Plutchik, 1980). However, this 
type of aid is expensive because it draws heavily upon the resources of others 
(cf. Coyne, 1976). Therefore, it is likely that sadness would be most effec- 
tive as an appeal for help if it were largely limited to situations in which the 
person was unable to cope effectively with the situation. Thus, in contrast 
to anger or guilt, which can motivate the person to change the situation, sad- 
ness appears to be most functional under conditions in which the person feels 
helpless to do so. 
Thus, the appraisal central to sadness, instead of being an attribution 
of the situation to impersonal circumstances, may be an appraisal that the 
situation is essentially uncontrollable. The relevant appraisal dimension, then, 
may be one of controllability, perhaps similar to the one discussed by Wein- 
er and his colleagues (e.g., Russell, 1982; Russell & McAuley, 1986; Weiner, 
1985; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982). We suspect that appraisals of 
situational control and controllability are highly correlated in adults, espe- 
cially in our college student sample, and thus that situations appraised as 
due to impersonal circumstances are also appraised as less controllable than 
those appraised as due to a human agent (either oneself or someone else). 
Resignation-Predictability and Low Effort. A feeling of resignation 
is likely to be experienced in aversive situations with predictable outcomes. 
Although the situation is unpleasant, the person does not anticipate expend- 
ing much effort. This pattern (see Table VIII) suggests that resignation may 
"motivate" the person to avoid futile struggles against the inevitable, and 
to accept and adapt to permanent difficulties, or to endure more temporary 
unavoidable unpleasantness. Thus, although both sadness and resignation 
tend to occur under uncontrollable circumstances, they may serve different 
functions. Whereas sadness serves as an appeal for help, resignation may 
motivate acceptance of that which cannot be changed. 
Further Issues 
The Emotional Relevance o f  Attentional Activity. Like certainty in In- 
vestigation 2, the manipulation of attentional activity in Investigation 3 failed 
to produce the predicted emotional differences. One reason for this failure 
appears to be that our instructions did not lead subjects to recall situations 
strongly associated with the experience of boredom, or with distinct states 
of disgust or frustration-the three unpleasant emotions for which appraisals 
Appraisal in Unpleasant Emotions 299 
of attentional activity are likely to be important. Thus, whether or not ap- 
praisals along the attentionat activity dimension are central to the experience 
of these three emotions remains an open question. Nevertheless, it is interest- 
ing that all of the emotions we observed were experienced at comparable levels 
in situations associated with either high or low attention. One possibility is 
that unpleasant experiences often involve considerable tension along the at- 
tention dimension. Although people may not want to think about unpleasant 
situations, they" may have to pay close attention in order to find a way to 
escape or end the unpleasantness. Thus, as Investigation 3 suggests, many 
unpleasant emotions may be commonly associated with situations in which 
the person wants to attend to the situation, to avoid thinking about it, or both. 
Hope. Of the nine emotions we examined, hope was least well predict- 
ed by the appraisal dimensions. We suspect that our relative failure to cap- 
ture the patterns of appraisal associated with hope highlights an important 
limitation of the present study. In comparison with the other emotions, hope 
is not tightly bound to the person's present circumstances. Instead, hope is 
linked to expectations for the future; people are able to feel hopeful under 
extremely adverse conditions if they can maintain the belief that "in the end" 
things may work out (Abelson, 1983; Lazarus et al., 1980). The appraisal 
ratings in the present study were designed to provide us with a "still photo- 
graph" of the person's appraisals and emotions at a single time. This metho- 
dology was very successful in providing us with relatively clear views of the 
appraisals associated with a number of emotions, but it did not really assess 
the person's past expectations or beliefs about the future. The failure to cap- 
ture the appraisals associated with hope emphasizes the need to examine the 
appraisal/emotion relations in a more dynamic context that more fully cap- 
tures these aspects of the appraisal process. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Working from a theoretical perspective that holds emotions to be adap- 
tive products of our evolution, we have replicated previous observations 
of strong relations between people's appraisal of their circumstances and their 
emotional state. The data suggest that certain of these appraisals are central 
to the experience of particular emotions. Comparing these central appraisals 
to the hypothetical functions of their related emotions, we have argued that 
the appraisals and functions are consistent. In general, the central appraisals 
tend to ensure that the emotion will be experienced when it adaptively guides 
the person's coping efforts. Examination of the central appraisals for resig- 
nation, an emotion not typically considered in traditional theories, led us 
to propose plausible functions for this emotion that can be explored in fu- 
ture studies. Conversely, examination of the functions of fear and sadness 
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led us to propose reconceptualizations of the appraisal dimensions central 
to these emotions. These results suggest the heuristic value of considering 
emotions from a functional perspective. 
At the same time, however, we would be remiss if we did not join our 
predecessors and colleagues (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1968; 
Tomkins, 1963) in admitting that emotional experiences are not always adap- 
tive. People may often misperceive their situations and respond with "inap- 
propriate" emotions, and even when the appraisals and emotional responses 
are "appropriate," the associated coping activities may often have very harm- 
ful consequences if they are not modulated by knowledge of social context 
and norms. Thus, if a person barges in front of you while you are standing 
in a long line at the grocery store, sternly suggesting that the person be fair 
and go to the end of the line might well be appropriate and adaptive, but 
physically attacking the person would not be. Nevertheless, we strongly be- 
lieve that the emotional system is fundamentally designed to, and often does, 
serve adaptive functions. 
Like any single study, this one leaves several questions unanswered and 
indicates new directions for future research. First, the appraisal view implies 
clear causal directions between appraisal and emotion: Appraisal determines 
emotion. However, this causality has yet to be clearly demonstrated. That 
our selection of experiences according to their appraisal characteristics 
produced predicted differences in emotional experience, combined with the 
finding that the central appraisals for particular emotions are related to the 
functions those emotions are believed to serve, increases the logical grounds 
for suspecting that appraisal leads to emotion. Nonetheless, as we have stat- 
ed previously (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987), it is still very important to demon- 
strate, through either experimental or longitudinal analysis, that changes in 
a person's appraisal of his or her circumstances produce systematic changes 
in that person's emotional state. Also, although our theory is a theory of 
the role of situational appraisals in the actual experience of emotions, much 
of our work (though not all, cf. Ellsworth & Smith, 1987; Smith, 1987; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1987) has used retrospective verbal reports and thus could 
conceivably relate more to ideas about emotions than to emotions themselves. 
Further, the present findings indicate that it is premature to conclude 
that the dimensional structure we have outlined here is the "correct" one. 
To the contrary, our results indicate several areas in which the dimensional 
structure needs to be further refined and elaborated (e.g., potential differ- 
ences between appraisals of responsibility and control, and between situa- 
tional control and controllability, need to be investigated, and the certainty 
dimension needs to be better defined). 
Finally, we believe that one of the most important new directions for 
future research is to examine the appraisal/emotion relations in the context 
of the behaviors they motivate and produce. The relations between emotions 
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and modes of coping need to be better delineated. In this regard, we feel 
that it is especially important to examine appraisal/emotion/coping relations 
in the context of emotional blending. We suspect that the coping tendencies 
motivated by individual emotions interact in emotional blends to produce 
even more adaptive coping than would be produced by single emotions in 
isolation. For instance, fear of retaliation (or of social sanctions, or of guilt) 
may often prevent us from assaulting those who anger us and, instead, may 
motivate us to modulate the anger, and to seek less overtly aggressive, more 
socially acceptable ways of eliminating the problem. In any case, we feel that 
it is of  vital importance to bring an examination of action tendencies (Frij- 
da, 1987) and coping activities (e.g., Fotkman & Lazarus, 1980; Folkman, 
Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986) into the study of ap- 
praisal/emotion relations. We believe that it is through such analyses that 
we will begin to firmly grasp the nature of the functions- and the failings- of 
human emotions. 
REFERENCES 
Abelson, R. P. (1983). Whatever became of consistency theory? Personality and Social Psy- 
chology Bulletin, 9, 37-54. 
Arnold, M. B. (1960). Emotion and personality (2 vols.). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Cannon, W. B. (1927). The James-Lange theory of emotion: A critical examination and an 
alternative theory. American Journal of  Psychology, 39, 106-124. 
Cannon, W. B. (1929). Bodily changes in pain, hunger, fear, and rage (2nd ed.). New York: 
Appleton-Century. 
Carlsmith, J. M., & Gross, A. E. (1969). Some effects of guilt on compliance. Journal of  Per- 
sonality and Social Psychology, 11, 232-239. 
Cohen, S., Sherrod, D. R., & Clark, M. S. (1986). Social skills and the stress protective role 
of social support. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 963-973. 
Coyne, J. (1976). Toward an interactional description of depression. Psychiatry, 39, 28-40. 
D'Andrade, R. G. (1981), The cultural part of cognition. Cognitive Science, 5, 179-195. 
Darwin, C. (1965). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1872) 
Ellsworth, P. C., & Smith, C. A. (1987). Models and memories of emotion: A comparison of 
their associated appraisals and facial expressions. Unpublished manuscript, Stanford 
University. 
Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1980). An analysis of coping in a middle-aged community sam- 
ple. Journal of  Health and Social Behavior, 21, 219-239. 
Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1985). If it changes it must be a process: Study of emotion 
and coping during three stages of a college examination. Journal of Personality and So- 
cial Psychology, 48, 150-170. 
Folkman, S., Lazarus, R. S., Dunkel-Schetter, C., DeLongis, A., & Gruen, R. J. (1986). The 
dynamics of a stressful encounter: Cognitive appraisal, coping, and encounter outcomes. 
Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 992-1003. 
Freedman, J. L., Wallington, S. A., & Bless, E. (1967). Compliance without pressure: The ef- 
fect of guilt. Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 117-124. 
Frijda, N. H., (1986). The emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Frijda, N. H. (1987). Emotion, cognitive structure, and action tendency. Cognition and Emo- 
tion, 1, 115-143. 
302 Ellsworth and Smith 
Izard, C. E. (1972). Patterns of  emotions. New York: Academic Press. 
Izard, C. E. (1977). Human emotions. New York: Plenum. 
James, W. (1950). The principles of  psychology (Vol. 2). New York: Dover. (Original work 
published 1890) 
Kone~ni, V. J. (t972). Some effects of guilt on compliance: A field replication. Journal of  Per- 
sonality and Social Psychology, 23, 30-32. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1968). Emotions and adaptation: Conceptual and empirical relations. In W. 
J. Arnold (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, 1968 (pp. 175-266). Lincoln: Univer- 
sity of Nebraska Press. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1982). Thoughts on the relations between emotion and cognition. American 
Psychologist, 37, 1019-1024. 
Lazarus, R. S., Kanner, A. D., & Folkman, S. (1980). Emotions: A cognitive-phenomenological 
analysis. In R. Plutchik & H. Kellerman (Eds.), Emotion: Theory, research, and ex- 
perience: Vol. 1. Theories of  emotion (pp. 189-217). New York: Academic Press. 
Leeper, R. W. (1948). A motivational theory of emotion to replace "emotion as disorganized 
response." Psychological Review, 55, 5-21. 
McGraw, K. M. (1987). Guilt following transgression: An attribution of responsibility approach. 
Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 247-256. 
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row. 
Plutchik, R. (1980). Emotion: A psychoevolutionary synthesis'. New York: Harper & Row. 
Regan, D. T., Williams, M., & Spading, S. (1972). Voluntary expiation of guilt: A field experi- 
ment. Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 42-45. 
Roseman, I. J. (1984). Cognitive determinants of emotions: A structural theory, in P. Shaver 
(Ed.), Review of  personality and socialpsychology: Vol. 5, Emotions, relationships, and 
health (pp. 11-36). Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. (1985). Contrast analysis: Focused comparisons in the analy- 
sis o f  variance. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Russell, D. (1982). The Causal Dimension Scale: A measure of how individuals perceive causes. 
Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 1137-t 145. 
Russell, D., & McAuley, E. (t986). Causal attributions, causal dimensions, and affective reac- 
tions to success and failure. Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 50, I 174-1185. 
Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A component process approach. 
In K. R. Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to emotion (pp. 293-317). Hillsdale, 
N J: Erlbaum. 
Schwartz, G. E., & Weinberger, D. A. (1980). Patterns of emotional responses to affective sit- 
uations: Relations among happiness, sadness, anger, fear, depression, and anxiety. Moti- 
vation and Emotion, 4, t75-191. 
Smith, C. A. (1987). The informational structure of the facial expression of emotion. Disserta- 
tion Abstracts International, 47, 4002B. (University Microfilms No. 87-00,820) 
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal 
o f  Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. 
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1987). Patterns of appraisal and emotion related to taking 
an exam. Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 475-488. 
Tomkins, S. S. (1963). Affect, imagery, consciousness: Vol. 2. The negative affects. New York: 
Springer. 
Wallington, S. A. (1973). Conseqnences of transgression: Self-punishment and depression. Journal 
of  Personality and Social Psychology, 28, 1-7. 
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. Psycho- 
logical Review, 92, 548-573. 
Weiner, B., Graham, S., & Chandler, C. (1982). Pity, anger, and guilt, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 8, 226-232. 
Zimbardo, P. G. (1970). The human choice: Individuation, reason and order versus deindivid- 
uation, impulse and chaos. In N. J. Arnold & D. Levine (Eds.), Nebraska symposium 
on motivation (pp. 237-307). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
